Underwriters' allocation with and without discretionary power: Evidence from the Hong Kong IPO market

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• 作者：Khelifa Mazouz^c ; ^{MazouzK@cardiff.ac.uk} ; Abdulkadir Mohamed^d ; ^{Abdulkadir.mohamed@cranfield.ac.uk} ; Brahim Saadouni^b ; ¹ ; ^{brahim.saadouni@manchester.ac.uk} ; Shuxing Yin^a ; ^{Shuxing.Yin@sheffield.ac.uk}
• 关键词：G1 ; G2 ; G3
• 刊名：International Review of Financial Analysis
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：49
• 期：Complete
• 页码：128-137
• 全文大小：304 K
• 卷排序：49

文摘

Examine the theory of adverse selection using 28.2 million Hong Kong IPO investors share applications. Two distinct regulatory regimes (discretionary against mandatory clawback provision) are tested. We find that, prior to the implementation of the regulation; uninformed investors benefit the least from the IPO market. The mandatory clawback provision has enhanced the fairness in IPO share allocations and reduced the winner’s curse problem. The Hong Kong regulator should resist the deregulation pressure to scrap the clawback provision