Imperfect cartelization in OPEC

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• 作者：Samuel J. Okullo^a ; ^d ; ^{s.j.okullo@uvt.nl} ; Fré ; dé ; ric Reynè ; s^b ; ^c ; ^{frederic.reynes@tno.nl}
• 关键词：Imperfect cartels ; Oil ; OPEC ; Nash bargaining ; Collusion strategies
• 刊名：Energy Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：60
• 期：Complete
• 页码：333-344
• 全文大小：667 K
• 卷排序：60

文摘

OPEC behavior fits neither non-cooperative oligopoly nor perfect cartelization. Heterogeneity between OPEC members impedes effective collusion. It's optimal for smaller OPEC producers to follow more expansionary production policies. Inelastic demand for oil is a headwind rather than tailwind for OPEC cooperation.