Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds

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• 作者：Tomoyuki Kamo^a ; ^{kamo@cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa^b
• 关键词：Arrovian social choice ; Psychological thresholds ; Intransitive indifference
• 刊名：Journal of Mathematical Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：63
• 期：Complete
• 页码：93-99
• 全文大小：886 K

文摘

This paper studies Arrovian preference aggregation rules–the rules satisfying weak Pareto and Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)–when individual preferences are nontransitive due to the existence of psychological thresholds — a problem of perceptible difference. A new domain replaces the universal domain, and rationality requirements of social preferences, i.e., transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity with indifference transitivity, are converted into the corresponding versions respectively. We show that the Arrovian impossibilities, i.e., dictator, oligarchy, and vetoer theorems, still survive in this setting.