“Buy-It-Now‿or “Sell-It-Now‿auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
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- 作者：Tim Grebea ; t.grebe@interval-berlin.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzelb ; ivanova-stenzel@tu-berlin.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Sabine Krö ; gerc ; sabine.kroger@ecn.ulaval.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：C72 ; C91 ; D44 ; D82
- 刊名：Economics Letters
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：May 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：142
- 期：Complete
- 页码：27-30
- 全文大小：816 K
文摘
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Study mechanisms where an auction follows a fixed price offer in case of rejection.
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Bargaining power has the person who offers the fixed price in this sequential mechanism.
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Analysis of two formats in which either the seller or a buyer offers the fixed price.
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An experimental comparison finds no effects on aggregate profits and efficiency.
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High price sellers benefit from bargaining power, low price sellers do not.