Contract governance and buyer-supplier conflict: The moderating role of institutions

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• 作者：Xuan Bai^a ; ^{baixuan@swufe.edu.cn" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Shibin Sheng^b ; ^{ssheng@uab.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Julie Juan Li^c ; ^{julieli@cityu.edu.hk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Behavior-based contract ; Output-based contract ; Conflict ; Legal enforceability ; Unilateral government support ; Institution theory
• 刊名：Journal of Operations Management
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：41
• 期：Complete
• 页码：12-24
• 全文大小：677 K

文摘

Drawing on contract governance literature and institutional theory, this study investigates the differential effects of output- and behavior-based contract governance on buyer–supplier conflict in supply chains. The authors develop a contingent perspective to examine how institutional factors moderate the impact of contract governance. The findings, from an empirical study of buyer–supplier dyads in China, show that an output-based contract is negatively, whereas a behavior-based contract is positively, related to buyer–supplier conflict. The effects of a contract are moderated by two primary institutional factors: legal enforceability and unilateral government support. These findings have important implications for supply chain research, public policy, and managerial practice.