Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital
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- 作者：Leyla D. Karakas lkarakas@maxwell.syr.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Endogenous political institutions ; Executive constraints ; Institutional Reform
- 刊名：European Journal of Political Economy
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：September 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：44
- 期：Complete
- 页码：195-213
- 全文大小：551 K
文摘
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The stability of strong executive constraints in democracies under powerful incumbents is studied.
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Powerful incumbents prefer weak constraints, and vice-versa.
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To prevent institutional reform, incumbents always invest in the society's democratic capital.
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Higher levels of democratic capital protect against the adoption of weak constraints.