PUCA: A pseudonym scheme with strong privacy guarantees for vehicular ad-hoc networks

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• 作者：David Fö ; rster ; ^a ; ^{david.foerster@de.bosch.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}Author Vitae ; Frank Kargl^b ; ^c ; ^{frank.kargl@uni-ulm.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}Author Vitae ; Hans Lö ; hr^a ; ^{hans.loehr@de.bosch.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}Author Vitae
• 关键词：Intelligent transportation systems ; Vehicular ad-hoc networks ; Location privacy ; Pseudonym schemes ; Security ; Anonymous credentials
• 刊名：Ad Hoc Networks
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：37
• 期：part_P1
• 页码：122-132
• 全文大小：1130 K

文摘

Pseudonym certificates are the state-of-the-art approach for secure and privacy-friendly message authentication in vehicular ad-hoc networks. However, most of the proposed pseudonym schemes focus on privacy among participants. Privacy towards backend providers is usually (if at all) only protected by separation of responsibilities. The protection can be overridden, when the entities collaborate, e.g. when revocation of long-term credentials is required. This approach puts the users’ privacy at risk, if the backend systems are not fully trusted.

We propose PUCA – a scheme that provides full anonymity for honest users, even against colluding backend providers. The scheme uses anonymous credentials for authentication with the backend, while leaving the communication among vehicles and with road side units unchanged and in compliance with existing standards. For removal of misbehaving vehicles from the system, we leverage a privacy-friendly revocation mechanism, that does not require resolution of pseudonyms. With our scheme, we demonstrate that strong and verifiable privacy protection in vehicular networks can be achieved, while fulfilling common security requirements, such as sybil-resistance and revocation.