Patent licensing under financial structure with limited liability

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• 作者：Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang^a ; ^b ; Yi-Jie Wang^c ; Wen-Jung Liang^c ; ^{wjliang@mail.ndhu.edu.tw} ; Ming-Che Tsai^d ; Chao-Cheng Mai^d ; ^e
• 关键词：L24 ; G33
• 刊名：International Review of Economics & Finance
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：46
• 期：Complete
• 页码：121-135
• 全文大小：579 K
• 卷排序：46

文摘

We study the optimal licensing means by considering the financial structure of firms and limited liability. We show the optimal licensing contract can be either royalty or fixed-fee licensing. We justify the superiority of royalty licensing by an endogenous way of varying the intensity of competition. Increasing mean-preserving variance of demand always results in bigger debt levels. Enhancing innovation size increases debt levels in non-exclusive fixed-fee licensing. Enhancing innovation size has no impact on debt levels in royalty licensing.