How hotel owner-operator goal congruence and GM autonomy influence hotel performance

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• 作者：Demian Hodari^a ; ^{demian.hodari@ehl.ch} ; Michael J. Turner^b ; ^{m.turner@business.uq.edu.au} ; Michael C. Sturman^c ; ^{mcs5@cornell.edu}
• 关键词：Hotel management agreement ; Owner ; Operator ; Goal congruency ; Performance ; Autonomy
• 刊名：International Journal of Hospitality Management
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：61
• 期：Complete
• 页码：119-128
• 全文大小：732 K
• 卷排序：61

文摘

A principal-agent relationship exists between hotel owners and the management companies which often operate their hotels. In addition, they both act as principals to a mutual agent, the hotel's General Manager, who is tasked with trying to achieve each parties' objectives. Extensive research on hotel management agreements which govern the owner-operator relationship has demonstrated that these objectives are often incongruent. However, the property-level managerial and performance implications of their goal incongruence has not been empirically examined. This study analyzes these issues using a matched sample of surveys from both owners and operators across 64 hotels operated under hotel management agreements. Using structural equations modeling, we demonstrate that owner-operator goal congruence positively impacts hotel performance and that this relationship is both mediated and moderated by the hotel General Manager's autonomy.