Implementation of voting operators

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• 作者：Anton Stefanescu and Massimiliano Ferrara
• 关键词：Voting operator ; Equilibrium ; Implementation
• 刊名：Journal of Mathematical Economics
• 出版年：2006
• 出版时间：June 2006
• 年：2006
• 卷：42
• 期：3
• 页码：315-324
• 全文大小：141 K

文摘

We show that a theory of implementation can be developed in the Aizerman–Aleskerov framework, capturing the main ideas regarding Nash implementation in the Arrovian case. In fact we obtain the counterparts of the results of [Maskin, E., 1977. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. MIT, Mimeo] and [Moore, J., Repullo, R., 1990. Nash implementation. A full characterization. Econometrica 58, 1038–1100] in the new framework.

We also propose a restatement of the implementation problem for voting operators, designing a direct mechanism where the individual strategies coincide with the choice profiles. Preserving the original sense of the strategy-proofness, if a voting rule is implementable then no individual can benefit by misrepresenting his options.