Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability

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• 作者：Dirk Bergemann^a ; ^{dirk.bergemann@yale.edu} ; Stephen Morris^b ; ^{smorris@princeton.edu} ; Satoru Takahashi^c ; ^{ecsst@nus.edu.sg}
• 关键词：C79 ; D82 ; D83
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：168
• 期：Complete
• 页码：329-371
• 全文大小：609 K
• 卷排序：168

文摘

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and  and , who characterize strategic distinguishability without interdependent preferences.