The influence of desire for control on monitoring decisions and performance outcomes in strategic alliances
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- 作者：Giuseppe Musarra ; G.Musarra@leeds.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding authorAuthor Vitae ; Matthew J. Robson M.J.Robson@lubs.leeds.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding authorAuthor Vitae ; Constantine S. Katsikeas csk@lubs.leeds.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding authorAuthor Vitae
- 关键词：Dark side ; Desire for control ; Monitoring ; Performance ; Substitutes and complements ; Governance mechanisms ; Strategic alliances
- 刊名：Industrial Marketing Management
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：May 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：55
- 期：Complete
- 页码：10-21
- 全文大小：664 K
文摘
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A firm's desire for control links to decisions on the use of process and output monitoring mechanisms.
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Process monitoring enhances performance in the alliance; output monitoring has a nonsignificant impact.
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Information exchange norms substitute for process monitoring, but complement output monitoring.
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Dark personality traits may produce forms of monitoring that are constructive in that they benefit alliance performance.