The efficiency and stability of R&D networks

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• 作者：Michael D. Kö ; nig^a ; ^b ; ^{mdkoenig@stanford.edu} ; Stefano Battiston^b ; Mauro Napoletano^c ; ^b ; Frank Schweitzer^b
• 关键词：D85 ; L24 ; O33
• 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：July, 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：75
• 期：2
• 页码：694-713
• 全文大小：367 K

文摘

We investigate the efficiency and stability of R&D networks in a model with network-dependent indirect spillovers. We show that the efficient network structure critically depends on the marginal cost of R&D collaborations. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient, while high marginal costs imply that the efficient network is asymmetric and has a nested structure. Regarding the stability of network structures, we show the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. The efficient network is stable for small industry size and small cost. In contrast, for large industry size, there is a wide region of cost in which the efficient network is not stable. This implies a divergence between efficiency and stability in large industries.