On Contractual Periods in Supplier Development

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• 作者：Karl Worthmann^&lowast ; ; ^{karl.worthmann@tu-ilmenau.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Philipp Braun^&lowast ; &lowast ; ; ^{philipp.braun@uni-bayreuth.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Michael Proch^&lowast ; &lowast ; &lowast ; ; ^{michael.proch@uni-bayreuth.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Jö ; rg Schl&uuml ; chtermann^&lowast ; &lowast ; &lowast ; ; ^{j.schluechtermann@uni-bayreuth.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; J&uuml ; rgen Pannek^&lowast ; &lowast ; &lowast ; &lowast ; ; ^{pan@biba.uni-bremen.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Supply chain management ; supplier development ; optimal control ; predictive control ; dynamic systems
• 刊名：IFAC-PapersOnLine
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：49
• 期：2
• 页码：60-65
• 全文大小：541 K

文摘

We consider supplier development within a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. Because supplier development usually requires relationship-specific investments, firms need to protect themselves against partner opportunism. Even though contracts are viewed as the primary formal means of safeguarding transactions, they also entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, particular in a dynamic and uncertain business environment. Thus, we propose a receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible contractual hazards while significantly increasing the overall supply chain profit. Our findings are illustrated by a numerical example.