Commitment versus discretion in a political economy model of fiscal and monetary policy interaction

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• 作者：David S. Miller ^{david.s.miller@frb.gov}
• 关键词：Price commitment ; Monetary policy ; Monetary fiscal policy interaction ; Time inconsistency
• 刊名：Journal of Monetary Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：December 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：84
• 期：Complete
• 页码：17-29
• 全文大小：400 K
• 卷排序：84

文摘

Microfounding fiscal policy affects monetary policy decisions. Time inconsistency is alleviated by the politically distorted fiscal authority. Monetary responses mitigate the political distortion׳s effect. Price commitment results in lower welfare as it eliminates monetary responses.