Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery

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• 作者：Klaus Abbink ; Kevin Wu ; ^{kevin.xc.wu@gmail.com}
• 关键词：C92 ; K42
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：133
• 期：Complete
• 页码：256-272
• 全文大小：2045 K
• 卷排序：133

文摘

A monetary reward for whistleblowers is proposed to destabilise petty bribery. Permitting both parties to self report halves the rate of bribe exchange. Permitting only one party to self-report did not significantly diminish corruption.