Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition: Theory and experiments

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• 作者：Peter T. Dijkstra ; ^a ; ^b ; ^{Peter.Dijkstra@acm.nl} ; Marco A. Haan^a ; ^{m.a.haan@rug.nl} ; Machiel Mulder^a ; ^b ; ^{machiel.mulder@rug.nl}
• 关键词：Collusion ; Industry structure ; Yardstick competition ; Experiment
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：1-33
• 全文大小：780 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

We study cartel stability in an industry subject to uniform yardstick regulation. Theory shows that the number of symmetric firms does not affect collusion. In an experiment we find that increasing the number of firms might foster collusion. Increasing heterogeneity increases the competitive price but makes collusion harder. Our experiment suggests that increasing heterogeneity reduces prices.