Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court
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- 作者：Nadia Fiorinoa ; Nicolas Gavoilleb ; Fabio Padovanob ; c ; fabio.padovano@univ-rennes1.fr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：D72 ; H1
- 刊名：International Review of Law and Economics
- 出版年：2015
- 出版时间：August 2015
- 年：2015
- 卷：43
- 期：Complete
- 页码：56-66
- 全文大小：649 K
文摘
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Are independent justices more likely to obtain politically controlled jobs after their mandate?
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Sample: Italian Constitutional Court justices from 1956 to 2006.
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We develop and estimate a measure of personal independence for each justice.
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Post-Court rewards are defined as politically controlled jobs.
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Independent justices are more likely to be rewarded after their tenure.