Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints

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• 作者：J&oacute ; zsef Garay^a ; ^{garayj@caesar.elte.hu} ; Villő Csiszá ; r^b ; ^{villo@ludens.elte.hu} ; Tamá ; s F. M&oacute ; ri^b ; ^{mori@math.elte.hu}
• 关键词：Evolutionary stability ; Matrix game ; Prisoner's dilemma ; Sharing problem ; Time constraint
• 刊名：Journal of Theoretical Biology
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：21 February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：415
• 期：Complete
• 页码：1-12
• 全文大小：605 K
• 卷排序：415

文摘

Matrix games with time constraints are introduced. In a Markov chain model we compute the average intake of phenotypes. We present conditions for evolutionary stability in these games. We find stable strategies in two special cases derived from the prisoner's dilemma. Depending on the payoffs and time durations, a variety of stable strategies emerge.