Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
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- 作者：Gabriel Carroll ; Delong Meng ; delong13@stanford.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Contract ; Principal&ndash ; agent problem ; Local robustness ; Worst-case ; Optimality-robustness tradeoff
- 刊名：Journal of Mathematical Economics
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：January 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：62
- 期：Complete
- 页码：36-51
- 全文大小：493 K
文摘
We consider a moral hazard problem in which the principal has a slight uncertainty about how the agent’s actions translate into output. An incentive contract can be made robust against an ϵ amount of uncertainty, at the cost of a loss to the principal on the order of 
, by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as ϵ goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment.
, by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as ϵ goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment.