Revision proofness

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• 作者：Laurence Ales ^{ales@andrew.cmu.edu" class="auth_mail} ; Christopher Sleet ; ^{csleet@andrew.cmu.edu" class="auth_mail}
• 关键词：C72 ; C73 ; E61
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：July 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：152
• 期：Complete
• 页码：324-355
• 全文大小：427 K

文摘

We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof. However, for the important class of quasi-recursive games careful construction of off-equilibrium play can render many, and in some cases all, sub-game perfect paths revision-proof.