Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen

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• 作者：Andrew Surtees^a ; ^b ; ^{adrsurtees@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Dana Samson^a ; Ian Apperly^b
• 关键词：Perspective-taking ; Theory of mind ; Visual perspective-taking
• 刊名：Cognition
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：148
• 期：Complete
• 页码：97-105
• 全文大小：950 K

文摘

A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children’s ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as “level-1” perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as “level-2” perspective-taking (  and ). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults’ level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.