Robust competitive auctions
详细信息 查看全文
- 作者：Seungjin Han ; hansj@mcmaster.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：C71 ; D82
- 刊名：Economics Letters
- 出版年：2015
- 出版时间：November 2015
- 年：2015
- 卷：136
- 期：Complete
- 页码：207-210
- 全文大小：358 K
文摘
- •
The Revelation Principle is not readily applicable in markets with many principals.
- •
Does a seller want to deviate to any mechanism in competing auctions (Peters 1997)?
- •
The sufficient condition for the robustness is embedded in its notion of equilibrium.