An incentive approach to land set-aside programs

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• 作者：Bourgeon ; Jean-Marc ; Jayet ; Pierre-Alain ; Picard ; Pierre
• 关键词：Q18 ; Set-aside programs ; Contract theory ; Asymmetric information
• 刊名：European Economic Review
• 出版年：1995
• 出版时间：October, 1995
• 年：1995
• 卷：39
• 期：8
• 页码：1487-1509
• 全文大小：1011 K

文摘

This paper is devoted to a theoretical analysis of policies aiming at reducing the supply of agricultural produce through contractual or mandatory land set-aside. The model relies on contract theory under adverse selection: it allows us to evaluate the impact of asymmetric information about yields on the optimal price support policy and on land set-aside. Specifically, we analyze an optimal contractual policy consisting of a subsidy system which makes transfers dependent on the set-aside area and a policy of mandatory land set-aside applying uniformly to all farms and ignoring incentive constraints. Numerical simulations allow us to assess and compare the respective effects of these policies.