Pricing and replenishment policies in a supply chain with competing retailers under different retail behaviors
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文摘
We study pricing and replenishment policies for a supply chain with multiple competing retailers. Both retail-competition and retail-cooperation models for a supply chain are considered. Retail cooperation is not stable and replenishment decision is largely affected by game scenario. A Groves wholesale price contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Coordination mechanism includes discount, competitive impact, and revenue regulator components.

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