Cartel pricing dynamics with reference-dependent preferences

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• 作者：Anton-Giulio Manganelli ^{ag.manganelli@upf.edu}
• 关键词：L13 ; L41
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：150
• 期：Complete
• 页码：91-94
• 全文大小：379 K
• 卷排序：150

文摘

Cartel pricing dynamics when consumers have reference-dependent preferences. Consumers are unsure whether a high price is due to collusion or high cost. High prices increase consumers’ belief that firms collude. Collusive prices rise over time alongside consumers’ price expectations. Collusive prices reach a steady-state when consumers are sure that firms collude.