Bridging the intuition gap in Cox's theorem: A Jaynesian argument for universality

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• 作者：Aubrey Clayton^a ; ¹ ; ^{aubreyiclayton@gmail.com} ; Travis Waddington^b
• 关键词：Cox ; Jaynes ; Bayesian ; Probability
• 刊名：International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：80
• 期：Complete
• 页码：36-51
• 全文大小：474 K
• 卷排序：80

文摘

Problems with technical assumptions in prior versions of Cox's theorem are explored. Remedies are proposed by restricting attention to propositional plausibilities. An invariance principle due to Jaynes is used to construct equiplausible examples. From these examples and assumptions an elementary proof of Cox's theorem follows.