Club good intermediaries

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• 作者：Simon Loertscher^a ; ^{simonl@unimelb.edu.au} ; Leslie M. Marx ; ^b ; ^{marx@duke.edu}
• 关键词：Revenue maximization ; Excludable public goods ; Two-sided platforms ; Optimal pricing ; Digital goods
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：430-459
• 全文大小：1217 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

Excludable public goods (club goods) include digital books, songs, and movies. Access to digital media is often through an intermediary (Amazon iTunes, Netflix). We analyze club good intermediaries in the IPV paradigm of Bayesian mechanism design. We characterize the optimal direct mechanism and provide an indirect implementation. Widely-used revenue sharing contracts (iTunes, e-books) are optimal in some setups.