International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis

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• 作者：Nobuyuki Takashima ; ^{ntakashima@econ.kyushu-u.ac.jp}
• 关键词：F53 ; H87 ; Q52 ; Q54
• 刊名：Economic Modelling
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：61
• 期：Complete
• 页码：312-320
• 全文大小：445 K
• 卷排序：61

文摘

Climate change mitigation generates social primary and private ancillary benefits. We examine the international environmental agreement (IEA) with ancillary benefits. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. We find that full participation is achievable even though ancillary benefits exist.