Flexible procurement contracts for competing retailers

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• 作者：Jen-Yi Chen ; ^a ; ^{j.chen27@csuohio.edu} ; Maqbool Dada^b ; ^{mdada1@jhu.edu} ; Qiaohai (Joice) Hu^c ; ^{qiaohahu@cityu.edu.hk}
• 关键词：Supply chain management ; Game theory ; Inventory ; Pricing
• 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：16 May 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：259
• 期：1
• 页码：130-142
• 全文大小：985 K
• 卷排序：259

文摘

We consider a manufacturer’s contract design problem for two competing retailers. When ordering in advance, retailers may order simultaneously or only one may order. In recourse stage, they may trade with each other or buy more from manufacturer. Our study sheds insights into the manufacturer’s and retailers’ contract preferences. We also show how production costs and demand variability affect such preferences.