How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective
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- 作者：Virginia Blanco-Mazagatos ; vblanco@ubu.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Esther de Quevedo-Puente equev@ubu.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Juan Bautista Delgado-Garcí ; a jbdelgado@ubu.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Family firm ; Agency theory ; Family managers ; Family owners ; Governance mechanisms ; Generational stage
- 刊名：Journal of Family Business Strategy
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：September 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：7
- 期：3
- 页码：167-177
- 全文大小：551 K
文摘
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We study the agency conflict between family owners and family managers.
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Family managers’ ownership positively influences second- and later-generation family firm performance.
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Family governance mechanisms and direct control positively affect second- and later-generation performance.
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We analyze a Spanish sample of private family firms wholly owned by a family.