Price caps with capacity precommitment
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- 作者：Ana B. Lemus <sup>alemus@eco.uc3m.essup> ; Diego Moreno<sup> ; sup><sup>diego.moreno@uc3m.essup>
- 关键词：Imperfect competition ; Demand uncertainty ; Price cap regulation ; Capacity investment ; Capacity withholding ; Capacity payments ; Monopoly
- 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：50
- 期：Complete
- 页码：131-158
- 全文大小：825 K
- 卷排序：50
文摘
Consider imperfectly competitive, demand uncertain, capacity precommited markets. A well chosen price cap (discourages) incentivizes capacity (withholding) investment. An optimal price cap trades off its effects on capacity investment and withholding. An optimal price cap is below the capacity maximizing one if cost of capacity is low. A Capacity payment combined with a price cap allows for a further surplus increase.