Competitive advantage of qualified WEEE recyclers through EPR legislation
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- 作者：Wenhui Zhoua ; Yanfang Zhenga ; Weixiang Huang ; b ; wxhuang4-c@my.cityu.edu.hk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; wade0769@hotmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; 414284903@qq.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Game theory ; Extended producer responsibility ; Reverse supply chain ; Self-financing subsidy
- 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：1 March 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：257
- 期：2
- 页码：641-655
- 全文大小：1060 K
文摘
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Study the price competition between two recyclers.
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Model the self-financing subsidy scheme built on EPR.
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Using up the fund does not necessarily result in a larger welfare.
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Highlight the role of EPR in terms of the interest of environment, consumers and firms.