The choice of energy saving modes for an energy-intensive manufacturer considering non-energy benefits

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• 作者：Jianjun Ouyang^a ; ^b ; ^{381100ouyang@sina.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Houcai Shen^a ; ^{hcshen@nju.edu.cn" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Energy efficiency management ; Energy performance contracting ; Non-energy benefits ; Game model
• 刊名：Journal of Cleaner Production
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：10 January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：141
• 期：Complete
• 页码：83-98
• 全文大小：2640 K

文摘

In practice, energy-intensive manufacturers have two main options when improving their energy efficiency: design and implement energy efficiency projects on their own (we call this self-saving) or enter into an energy performance contracting (EPC), which mainly includes shared savings and guaranteed savings. In this paper, we will discuss an energy-intensive manufacturer facing self-saving and shared savings options and how this manufacturer chooses the optimal energy saving mode when non-energy benefits are considered. We only consider “costs and profit” as non-energy benefits and formulate an optimization model of self-saving and a Stackelberg game model of shared savings. From our model analysis, when considering only energy savings, we find that the optimal unit savings has a monotonic impact on the optimal profit of the manufacturer. Our results indicate that: the manufacturer will prefer the second option to the first when the investment cost factor ratio of the energy service company (ESCO) to the manufacturer is small; otherwise, the manufacturer will prefer the first to the second. Furthermore, when considering non-energy benefits, we find that the results change in some cases.