Social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception

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• 作者：Helmuth Cremer^a ; ^{helmuth.cremer@tse-fr.eu} ; Kerstin Roeder^b ; ^{kerstin.roeder@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de}
• 关键词：Social insurance ; Optimal taxation ; Adverse selection ; Risk misperception
• 刊名：Journal of Public Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：146
• 期：Complete
• 页码：138-147
• 全文大小：460 K
• 卷排序：146

文摘

We study the role of social insurance to supplement income taxation when individuals differ in risk and ability. Private insurance markets suffer from adverse selection. Social insurance for the poor (rich) has negative (positive) incentive effects but increases (decreases) coverage. Social insurance either for the rich or for the poor is always desirable. Risk misperception may or may not strengthen the need for social insurance.