Dynamic Congestion and Tolls with Mobile Source Emission

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• 作者：Terry L. Friesz ; Ke Han ; Hongcheng Liu ; Tao Yao
• 关键词：Congestion toll ; Dynamic user equilibrium ; mobile source emission ; dynamic Stackelberg game
• 刊名：Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：7 June, 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：80
• 期：Complete
• 页码：818-836
• 全文大小：195 K

文摘

This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as mathematical programming with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty- based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission.