Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economy

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• 作者：Jiuqiang Liu ; ^{jliu@emich.edu}
• 关键词：Bargaining sets ; Cores ; Competitive equilibrium ; Coalition production economy ; Exchange economy
• 刊名：Journal of Mathematical Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：68
• 期：Complete
• 页码：55-61
• 全文大小：468 K
• 卷排序：68

文摘

Mas-Colell (Mas-Colell, 1989) proved that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide in an exchange economy with a continuum of traders under some standard assumptions. In the case of pure exchange economies with a finite number of traders it is well-known that the set of competitive allocations could be a strict subset of the core which can also be a strict subset of the bargaining set. In this paper, we show that the Aubin bargaining set (or fuzzy bargaining set) and the set of competitive allocations coincide in a finite coalition production economy under some standard assumptions. We also show that the (Mas-Colell) bargaining set shrinks to the set of competitive allocations in a finite coalition production economy EE under some standard conditions when EE is replicated. As a consequence, the existence of competitive equilibrium in a finite coalition production economy implies the nonemptiness of Aubin bargaining sets.