On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching

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• 作者：Deniz Dizdar^a ; ¹ ; ^{deniz.dizdar@umontreal.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Benny Moldovanu^b ; ¹ ; ^{mold@uni-bonn.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：C78 ; D82
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：165
• 期：Complete
• 页码：106-123
• 全文大小：398 K

文摘

The paper provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of uniform, fixed-proportion rules for sharing surplus in two-sided markets. We study a two-sided matching model with transferable utility where agents are characterized by privately known, multi-dimensional attributes that jointly determine the surplus of each potential partnership. We ask the following question: for what divisions of surplus within matched pairs is it possible to implement the efficient (surplus-maximizing) matching? Our main result shows that the only robust rules compatible with efficient matching are those that divide realized surplus in a fixed proportion, independently of the attributes of the pair's members: each agent must expect to get the same fixed percentage of surplus in every conceivable match. A more permissive result is obtained for one-dimensional attributes and supermodular surplus functions.