Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
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- 作者：Carl Vellera ; b ; carlveller@fas.harvard.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Laura K. Haywardc ; lhayward@math.columbia.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：C62 ; C72 ; C73
- 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：March 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：162
- 期：Complete
- 页码：93-113
- 全文大小：552 K
文摘
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Finite-population evolution is a useful model of imitation learning.
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This is especially so for asymmetric games when their Nash equilibria are not strict.
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We study the evolutionary dynamics in these games when mutations are rare.
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We provide a simple method of calculating the limit distribution.
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It is simpler than for the symmetric game case, yielding sharper results.