Trade and revelation of information

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• 作者：Tito Pietra ; Paolo Siconolfi
• 关键词：Asymmetric information ; Partially revealing equilibria D5
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2008
• 出版时间：January 2008
• 年：2008
• 卷：138
• 期：1
• 页码：132-164
• 全文大小：395 K

文摘

We consider an economy with asymmetric information and two types of agents, fully informed and uninformed. Uninformed agents update their information observing equilibrium prices and the equilibrium levels of other agents’ excess demand. We show that, for a generic set of economies, there are rational expectations equilibria which are partially revealing on an open, dense set of signals of positive Lebesgue measure, provided that the dimension of the signal space is sufficiently larger than the dimension of the commodity space.