Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence

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• 作者：Claudia Moellers^a ; ^{moellers@dice.hhu.de} ; Hans-Theo Normann^a ; ^{normann@dice.hhu.de} ; Christopher M. Snyder ; ^b ; ^{chris.snyder@dartmouth.edu}
• 关键词：Commitment ; Communication ; Experiments ; Vertical restraints
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：214-258
• 全文大小：1529 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

Study experimental vertical markets with upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. In basic experimental condition with no communication, commitment problem prevents industry from achieving monopoly outcome; allowing public communication among all firms results in fairly complete monopolization. Allowing private communication between upstream and each downstream firm moves industry halfway toward monopoly outcome; allowing public communication among all firms results in fairly complete monopolization. Communication also shifts the distribution of rents between upstream and downstream in a pattern well explained by Nash-in-Nash bargaining. Using third-party coders, unsupervised text mining, among other approaches, we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes.