Optional contributions have positive effects for volunteering public goods games

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• 作者：Qi-Qing  ; Song^a ;   ; ^b ;   ; ^{songqiqing@126.com} ; Zhen-Peng  ; Li^c ;   ; ^d ;   ; ^{lnlzhp@126.com} ; Chang-He  ; Fu^e ;   ; ^f ;   ; ^a ;   ; ^CFu@tmhs.org ; Lai-Sheng  ; Wang^a ;   ; ^{wanglaish@sina.com}
• 关键词：Public goods games ; Optional contributions ; Cooperation
• 刊名：Physica A
• 出版年：2011
• 出版时间：1 November 2011
• 年：2011
• 卷：390
• 期：23-24
• 页码：4236-4243
• 全文大小：1031 K

文摘

Public goods (PG) games with the volunteering mechanism are referred to as volunteering public goods (VPG) games, in which loners are introduced to the PG games, and a loner obtains a constant payoff but not participating the game. Considering that small contributions may have positive effects to encourage more players with bounded rationality to contribute, this paper introduces optional contributions (high value or low value) to these typical VPG games¡ªa cooperator can contribute a high or low payoff to the public pools. With the low contribution, the logit dynamics show that cooperation can be promoted in a well mixed population comparing to the typical VPG games, furthermore, as the multiplication factor is greater than a threshold, the average payoff of the population is also enhanced. In spatial VPG games, we introduce a new adjusting mechanism that is an approximation to best response. Some results in agreement with the prediction of the logit dynamics are found. These simulation results reveal that for VPG games the option of low contributions may be a better method to stimulate the growth of cooperation frequency and the average payoff of the population.