Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws
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- 作者：Rahul Bhargava rahulb@unr.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Sheri Faircloth sherif@unr.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Hongchao Zeng ; hzeng@unr.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Takeover protection ; Stock price crash risk ; State antitakeover laws ; Corporate governance ; Agency conflicts
- 刊名：Journal of Business Research
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：70
- 期：Complete
- 页码：177-184
- 全文大小：326 K
文摘
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Takeover pressures can incentivize managers to engage in bad news hoarding activities.
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Takeover protection is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk.
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The relation is more pronounced in the presence of severe information asymmetry.
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The relation is more pronounced when firms face strong product market competition.
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Empirical analyses are conducted in a difference-in-differences framework.