Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
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- 作者：Raphael Boleslavsky ; r.boleslavsky@miami.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Tracy R. Lewis
- 关键词：D80 ; D82 ; D83 ; D86
- 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：July 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：98
- 期：Complete
- 页码：110-134
- 全文大小：666 K
文摘
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We study evolution of influence in an advice game with extreme interest conflict.
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The optimal mechanism provides incentives via compromise and cross-checking.
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Distortions associated with compromise are positive and fixed.
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Distortions associated with cross-checking can be large but vanish in the long term.