Misuse-based detection of Z-Wave network attacks
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- 作者：Jonathan D. Fuller
- 关键词：Z-Wave ; Wireless sensor networks ; Vulnerability analysis ; Wireless security ; Intrusion detection
- 刊名：Computers & Security
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：64
- 期：Complete
- 页码：44-58
- 全文大小：1977 K
文摘
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are becoming ubiquitous, providing low-cost, low-power, and low-complexity systems in which communication and control are tightly integrated. Although much security research into WSNs has been accomplished, researchers struggle to conduct thorough analyses of closed-source proprietary protocols. Of the numerous available and underanalyzed proprietary protocols, those based on the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation specifying narrow-band sub-GHz communications have recently experienced significant growth. The Z-Wave protocol is the most common implementation of this recommendation. Z-Wave developers are required to sign nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, limiting the availability of tools to perform open source research. Given recently demonstrated attacks against Z-Wave networks, defensive countermeasures are needed. This work extends an existing implementation of a Z-Wave Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection System (MBIDS). A side-by-side comparison is performed through experimentation to measure misuse detection accuracy of the baseline and extended MBIDS implementations. Experiment results determine the extended MBIDS achieves a mean misuse detection rate of 99%, significantly improving the security posture in MBIDS-monitored Z-Wave networks.