Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly
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文摘

We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government.

We capture the firm’s responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design.

We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs.

The impacts of the budget and consumers’ environmental awareness are explored.

No contract type is always dominating or dominated.

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