Families of supply chain coordinating contracts in the presence of retailer effort
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- 作者：Xinghao Yan ; xyan@ivey.uwo.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Gregory S. Zaric
- 关键词：Supply chain coordination ; Promotional effort ; Supply contracts ; Contract family ; Incentives
- 刊名：International Journal of Production Economics
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：May 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：175
- 期：Complete
- 页码：213-225
- 全文大小：405 K
文摘
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We study a supply chain in the presence of retailer effort.
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We classify all contracts in five families.
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We study the coordinating contracts in each family.
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We show that “simple-format” contracts cannot achieve coordination.
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We study extensions with more decisions and different decision structure.