Strategic customer behavior facing possible stockout: An experimental study

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• 作者：Yanan Song ; Xiaobo Zhao ; ^{xbzhao@tsinghua.edu.cn" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Strategic customer ; Nash equilibrium ; Incentive compatibilitybounded rationality
• 刊名：International Journal of Production Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：October 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：180
• 期：Complete
• 页码：57-67
• 全文大小：866 K

文摘

This paper studies strategic customer behavior in a monopolistic seller system. Given the stock quantity and the selling prices, a customer chooses either to buy at the full price to certainly obtain a product or to wait for a discount with the risk of stockout. We model the behavior of strategic customers as a customer-game. It is shown that the customer-game may have multiple Nash equilibria. Specifically, in the condition of weak incentive compatibility, the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is “all-wait”, which is inconsistent with the “all-buy” assumption in the literature. We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate behavior of strategic customers. The results show that customers' behaviors exhibit a deviation from Nash equilibria. Using a framework of quantal response equilibrium, we develop behavioral models to effectively characterize the behavior of strategic customers.