Trade-off between learning and exploitation: The Pareto-optimal versus evolutionarily stable learning schedule in cumulative cultural evolution

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Joe Yuichiro Wakano ; Chiaki Miura
• 关键词：Cumulative culture ; Pareto-optimal strategy ; Evolutionarily stable strategy ; Two-stage life history ; Public goods game
• 刊名：Theoretical Population Biology
• 出版年：February, 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：91
• 期：Complete
• 页码：37-43
• 全文大小：516 K

文摘

Inheritance of culture is achieved by social learning and improvement is achieved by individual learning. To realize cumulative cultural evolution, social and individual learning should be performed in this order in one鈥檚 life. However, it is not clear whether such a learning schedule can evolve by the maximization of individual fitness. Here we study optimal allocation of lifetime to learning and exploitation in a two-stage life history model under a constant environment. We show that the learning schedule by which high cultural level is achieved through cumulative cultural evolution is unlikely to evolve as a result of the maximization of individual fitness, if there exists a trade-off between the time spent in learning and the time spent in exploiting the knowledge that has been learned in earlier stages of one鈥檚 life. Collapse of a fully developed culture is predicted by a game-theoretical analysis where individuals behave selfishly, e.g., less learning and more exploiting. The present study suggests that such factors as group selection, the ability of learning-while-working (鈥渙n the job training鈥?, or environmental fluctuation might be important in the realization of rapid and cumulative cultural evolution that is observed in humans.