The evolution of risk and bailout strategy in banking systems

详细信息    查看全文

• 关键词：Financial contagion ; Agent-based model ; Bank insolvency ; Evolutionary game theory ; Simulation ; Networks
• 刊名：Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：15 February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：468
• 期：Complete
• 页码：109-118
• 全文大小：811 K
• 卷排序：468

文摘

We study contagion and bailout strategies in a stylised banking system over time. Banks adjust risk taking in response to system dynamics and regulatory intervention. Poor intervention strategies encourage excessive risk and hinder stability. Bailouts should consider the topology of and risk allocation on banking networks. Interventions aimed at bank configurations with anti-correlated risk are superior.